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CASE COMMENTS
EXPORTS AND PATENT INFRINGEMENT: THE
TEST OF MANUFACTURE "WITHIN THE UNITED
STATES"
When an inventor receives a patent, he obtains not the right to make,
use or vend the patented invention, but rather the right to exclude others
from making, using or vending it.' This historic right is provided for in
the Constitution. 2 The territorial limitations on this right, as provided in
the Patent Act, show it to exist only within the United States.3 The patent
holder may assert his right to exclude from the domestic market by a suit
for infringement against a non-patent holder who makes, uses or vends
the patented invention. However, the availability of foreign markets may
induce a non-patent holding domestic competitor to produce the patented
product and export it. Courts have held that in this situation there is no
infringement if the non-patent holder has not rendered the device operable
within the United States, even though he has engaged in manufacture and
partial assembly of it.' A recent decision in the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals substituted a different test to determine infringement of patented
export items.
'Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 35-36 (1923). In a
principal case in this field, Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539 (1852), Chief Justice Taney
stated:
The franchise which the patent grants, consists altogether in the right to
exclude every one from making, using, or vending the thing patented,
without the permission of the patentee.
55 U.S. at 549. See Powell, The Nature of a Patent Right, 17 COLUM. L. Rav. 663, 665
(1917); Riesenfeld, The New United States Patent Act in the Light of Comparative Law I,
102 U. PA. L. REv. 291, 310 (1954).
2U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, provides:
The Congress shall have power . . . To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries
-The Patent Act of July 19, 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a) (1970) reads as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority
makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States dur-
ing the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.
(Emphasis added). This territorial limitation was recognized by the Supreme Court in
Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915). See 4 A.
DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS § 216 (2d ed. 1965); R. NORDHAUS & E. JUROW, PATENT-
ANTITRUST LAW 140-52 (1961).
'Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Link-Belt Co., 371 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1966); Cold Metal
Process Co. v. United Eng'r & Foundry Co., 235 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1956); Radio Corp. of
America v. Andrea, 79 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1935).
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In Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co.,5 the patent holder'
brought an infringement suit against a competitor who was manufactur-
ing and exporting his patented device, a machine for cleaning shrimp.
1
Deepsouth produced all parts of this device within the United States, and
assembled all but two of them before exporting it to a customer in Brazil.
Upon arrival, it took less than one hour to make the machine completely
operable. The district court held that such manufacture and sale did not
constitute infringement of Laitram's patent.8 The court found that Deep-
south did not "make" its machine within the United States since it was
exported prior to being assembled in operable condition. In construing the
meaning of the word "makes" in the Patent Act,9 the court utilized the
export infringement test of "final operable assembly" adopted by three
circuit courts. 0
However, this interpretation of the word "makes" was not approved
by the Fifth Circuit. In reversing the district court's decision, the Fifth
Circuit declined to follow the test of final operable assembly but used
instead a test of "substantial manufacture"." The court stated:
The word "makes" should not be given an artificial, technical
construction but should be accorded a construction in keeping with
the ordinary meaning of that term ...
We hold that "makes" means what it ordinarily connotes-the
substantial manufacture of the constituent parts of the machine."2
Deepsouth's product was substantially manufactured within the United
States prior to export, even though the final nuts and bolts were to be
assembled overseas, and thus infringed Laitram's patent.
The final assembly test of patent infringement appears to have been
first applied by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Radio
Corp. ofAmerica v. Andrea,13 which involved an infringement suit against
a manufacturer of radios. Andrea made and assembled all parts of the
patented invention except the vacuum tubes. Prior to shipment overseas,
5443 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 197 1), petition for cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3095 (U.S. Sept.
14, 1971) (No. 71-315).
6Laitram's patent was held valid in the companion case of Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth
Packing Co., 301 F. Supp. 1037 (E.D. La. 1969).
7For a complete and detailed description of this device, see Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth
Packing Co., 301 F. Supp. 1037 (E.D. La. 1969).
8Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 310 F. Supp. 926 (E.D. La. 1970).
'Note 3 supra.
"Note 4 supra.
"Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 936, 939 (5th Cir. 1971).
"Id. at 938-39.
1179 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1935).
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the tubes were packaged separately and placed in the same carton as the
receiver. The importing buyer merely had to insert the tubes into place to
make the receiver operable.14 The issue was whether Andrea, in manufac-
turing all parts save one and in performing most of the assembly, had
violated the holder's United States patent. The Second Circuit held that
Andrea did not infringe the patent because the radios were not "made",
that is, made operable, within the United States:
No wrong is done the patentee until the combination is formed. His
monopoly does not cover the manufacture or sale of separate ele-
ments capable of being, but never actually, associated to form the
invention. Only when such association is made is there a direct
infringement of his monopoly, and not even then if it is done
outside the territory for which the monopoly was granted. 15
However, on a second appeal by the patent holder,"6 it was determined
that the tubes had been inserted within the United States and that the
combination had been completed for testing purposes. Though the tubes
were disconnected for shipment, the Second Circuit modified its decree,
saying:
Where the elements of an invention are thus sold in substantially
unified and combined form, infringement may not be avoided by
a separation or division of parts which leaves to the purchaser a
simple task of integration. Otherwise, a patentee would be denied
adequate protection. 7
Similar fact situations subsequently arose in the Third and Seventh
Circuit Courts of Appeal." Both circuits held that there was no infringe-
ment of the patent under the rationale of the first Andrea opinion, since
there had been no complete assembly within the United States. In the
Seventh Circuit case of Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Link-Belt Co.,1 the ma-
chine's parts were exported in numerous shipments over a three-month
period. Many parts had arrived overseas before other parts were even
manufactured. Thus, the machine could not have been completely assem-
bled within the United States, and under the test of final operable assem-





6Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea, 90 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1937).
'71d. at 613.
"8Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Link-Belt Co., 371 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1966); Cold Metal
Process Co. v. United Eng'r & Foundry Co., 235 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1956).
11371 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1966).
2Id. at 229.
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This final assembly test seems to have been derived by analogy to a
fundamental concept of patent law:
If anything is settled in the patent law, it is that the combination
patent covers only the totality of the elements in the claim and that
no element, separately viewed, is within the grant.
2'
The purposes behind this rule are to favor free competition and to prevent
the patent holder from obtaining a monopoly over the different parts of
his patented machine. 22 The patent law encourages invention by giving a
patent to the ingenious individual who makes the first discovery. 2 How-
ever, the inventor is not rewarded with control over the separate compo-
nents of the machine protected by a combination patent;24 the public may
still use such parts.2? This same dual purpose is found in the analogous
situation of permitting the export of essentially the entire patented device.
The test of final operable assembly limits a patent holder's monopoly
by narrowing the criteria for finding the exporting competitor guilty of
infringement. This is accomplished through a very precise construction of
the word "makes" in the Patent Act.2 6 Before final assembly the parts
cannot operate as a whole, and the machine is not deemed "made". It is
made when it is operational, and only then is it entitled to protection?
21Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 344 (1961); accord,
Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1943); Brown v.
Guild, 90 U.S. 181 (1874).
nGraham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). The Supreme Court stated that
Congress may not
enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advance-
ment or social benefit gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not au-
thorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowl-
edge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already
available.
Id. at 6. See generally Harris & Siegel, Positive Competition and the Patent System, 3 PAT.,
T.M., & C.R.J. OF RESEARCH & EDUCATION 21 (1959).
2Potts v. Coe, 145 F.2d 27, 31 (1944). See I A. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS § 8
(2d ed. 1964).
24A combination patent protects a device, the elements of which perform some joint
operation, producing a result due to their joint and cooperating action. Aro Mfg. Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 344-46 (1961). This is to be distinguished
from the forming of the "combination" in the principal case, where the combination was
formed by final assembly outside the United States. 443 F.2d at 938. See text accompanying
note 15 supra.
2Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961); Mercoid
Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1943); Brown v. Guild, 90
U.S. 181 (1874).
2See note 3 and text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
2Note 4 supra.
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The test allows no middle ground; there is no category of "almost made"
This rationale was wholly accepted in the district court's decision in
Laitram:
The first Andrea result. . . is founded on twin notions that under-
lie the patent laws. One is that a combination patent protects only
the combination. The other is that monopolies-even those con-
ferred by patents-are not viewed with favor.2s
The Fifth Circuit reversed, however, since it found previous analysis of
the problem, as stated in Andrea,29 to be unrealistic and fallacious.30 The
circuit court felt that by giving a more expansive interpretation to the
word "makes", it was defending the patentee's right to exclude infringers
under its patent on the entire machine. 31 This was not regarded as being
inconsistent with the rule that a combination patent does not protect
individual parts.32 The court believed that its substantial manufacture test
protected the patent holder from the efforts of a competitor for the export
market, who could circumvent the patentee's rights by failing to assemble
two parts within the United States.3
Underlying the Fifth Circuit's opinion is the idea that a patent is not
a true monopoly, as it does not restrict public use of pre-existing rights.
A device originates within the inventor's resourceful mind, and thus is
worthy of protection. This theory is not without support.Y However, a
23Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 310 F. Supp. 926,929 (E.D. La. 1970).
aRadio Corp. of America v. Andrea, 79 F.2d 626, 628 (2d Cir. 1935).
1443 F.2d at 938.
3td. at 939.
1'Note 25 supra.
33n describing the efforts by Deepsouth to circumvent the final assembly test, the Fifth
Circuit quoted from a letter written by the president of Deepsouth to his Brazilian customer:
We are handicapped by a decision against us in the United States. This
was a very technical decision and we can manufacture the entire machine
without any complication in the United States, with the exception that
there are two parts that must not be assembled in the United States, but
assembled after the machine arrives in Brazil. This assembly will take less
than one hour.
443 F.2d at 938.
"United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933). The Supreme Court
stated:
[A] patent is not, accurately speaking, a monopoly. . . .The term "mo-
nopoly" connotes the giving of an exclusive privilege for buying, selling,
working or using a thing which the public freely enjoyed prior to the grant.
Thus a monopoly takes something from the public. An inventor deprives
the public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery, but gives
something of value to the community by adding to the sum of human
knowledge.
289 U.S. at 186. See I A. DELLER, NVALKER ON PATENTS § 6, at 48-49 (2d ed. 1964); R.
1972]
178 WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. XXIX
patent does have a monopolistic aspect. Bringing a new product into the
market creates commerce, but excluding others from making or selling it
restricts commerce.3 The Fifth Circuit's holding tends to give the patent
holder a monopoly of a greater extent than that previously thought allow-
able by the Patent Act, 6 for it allows him to exclude a competitor from
selling overseas an inoperable, though substantially completed machine.
The Fifth Circuit would justify its test by reference to the Constitu-
tion's provisions protecting patent holders for a limited time in order to
promote technology by inducing inventors to disclose their discoveries for
the good of society.3 7 The patent grant promotes technological develop-
ment by providing an incentive and reward for the inventor. However, the
primary objective of the patent provisions is public benefit.3 1 Promotion
of technological progress must come first, while the inventor's reward has
been regarded as secondary.
39
NORDHAUS & E. JUROW, PATENT-ANTITRUST LAW 12-14 (1961); Harris & Siegel, Positive
Competition and the Patent System, 3 PAT., T.M. & C.R.J. OF RESEARCH & EDUCATION
21, 30 (1959); Maffei, The Patent Misuse Doctrine: A Balance of Patent Rights and the
Public Interest, 52 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 178, 184 (1970).
3"It has been said by the court that the patentee has the right to exclude competitors
. . . whatever the patentee's reasons may be." Byers Mach. Co. v. Keystone Driller Co.,
44 F.2d 283, 285 (6th Cir. 1930). If the patent holder does agree to license others under his
grant, he may fix prices at which the item may be sold and impose provisions restricting
marketing practices. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926); Glen
Raven Knitting Mills v. Sanson Hosiery Mills, 189 F.2d 845, 854 (4th Cir. 1951). See R.
NORDHAUS. & E. JUROW, PATENT-ANTITRUST LAW 124-40 (1961). See also F. MACHLUP,
AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM. S. RES. No. 236, 8th Cong., 2d Sess.
74-76 (1958).
3See note 3 supra.
3Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 936, 939 (5th Cir. 1971); see note
2 supra.
IsKendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322 (1858). The Supreme Court in this case stated:
It is undeniably true, that the limited and temporary monopoly granted
to inventors was never designed for their exclusive profit or advantage; the
benefit to the public or community at large was another and doubtless the
primary object in granting and securing that monopoly.
Id. at 327-28.
"In his concurring opinion in United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948),
Justice Douglas stated:
It is to be noted first that all that is secured to inventors is "the exclusive
right" to their inventions; and second that the reward to inventors is
wholly secondary, the aim and purpose of patent statutes being limited by
the Constitution to the promotion of the progress of science and useful
arts. . ..
The Court . . . has generally been faithful to the standard of the
Constitution, has recognized that the public interest comes first and reward
to inventors second, and has refused to let the self-interest of patentees
come into the ascendency.
Id. at 316. See Van Cise, Antitrust Laws and Patents, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 776, 778 (1970).
Contra, United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926).
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Free competition is served when one manufacturer does not have a
monopoly over the trade in a particular item. Congress has prohibited
general business monopolies within the United States since they tend to
*eliminate such competition and enhance private reward.40 A patent grant
may also have these tendencies, but disclosure of the new invention has
been held to outweigh the monopolistic aspect of the right to exclude, 4
which exists only within the United States.42 If an inventor desires a
foreign monopoly, he may apply for a patent from the importing country
in which he wishes to control the trade of his product.1
3
Export sales are important to the United States economy since they
represent the difference between profit and loss for many American manu-
facturers.44 Foreign sales may also significantly affect the United States
employment situation.4" The economy benefits from an excess in receipts
for exported merchandise over expenditures for imported goods. When
exports exceed imports, the net result is a short-term favorable balance
of trade.46
Applying these considerations to the principal case, it appears that the
Fifth Circuit has provided the patent holder with an unprecedented degree
of protection. This decision tends to assure the patent holder a greater
share of the foreign market and an expanded private reward since the
competing manufacturer may be excluded from overseas trade. This ex-
clusion will tend to result in an unfavorable balance of trade, assuming
that the patentee and the infringer together would sell more than would
the patentee alone.
If the Fifth Circuit continues to use its test, certain problems are
foreseeable in its application. Under this test, the patent protects a ma-
'0 For example, in 1890, the Sherman Act, Pub. L. No. 51-647, as amended 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970), was passed to prohibit restraints of trade and monopolies. Then in
1914, the Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970), was
passed to prevent specific trade abuses such as price discrimination, the use of interlocking
directorates among large corporations, and the acquisition of one corporation by another.
411n exchange for the inventor's right to exclude the public for a definite term, the public
receives disclosure of the new device which the inventor might not otherwise have revealed.
Waterbury Buckle Co. v. G.E. Prentice Mfg. Co., 294 F. 930, 938 (D. Conn. 1923).
12Cf. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Rubber Tire Wheel Co., 164 F. 869, 873
(C.C.S.D. Ohio 1908).
aSee note 3 supra.
11J. HESS & P. CATEORA, INTERNATIONAL MARKETING 4-5 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
HEss]; R. KRAMER, M. D'ARLIN & F. ROOT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THEORY, POLICY,
PRACTICE 47 (1959) [hereinafter cited as KRAMER].
4'World trade may permit the United States to utilize employment resources at a high
level of productivity. HESS at 69; KRAMER at 48.4
1HEss at 74; KRAMER at 113-27.
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chine's major elements,4 7 and a problem might arise in determining when
these elements are constructed. The test might easily apply to the situation
found in Andrea,' where final assembly was nearly complete, in which
case the Fifth Circuit would probably have found infringement. However,
the Hewitt-Robins case4" presents a more complex situation since parts
were exported separately over a three-month period; the non-patent holder
was indeed supplying the overseas buyer with a patented machine. The
Fifth Circuit might refuse to countenance this, condemning it as another
scheme to deprive the patent holder of his due. 5 In short, one can foresee
innumerable situations presenting varying degrees of assembly, where it
would be difficult to ascertain that point where the various elements lose
their identity and assume that of the patented machine. The Fifth Circuit
seems to have provided no guidance on where the line is to be drawn.
Another problem inherent ihi this test, upon which the Fifth Circuit
expressly did not rule, 5' is the effect of using parts supplied by the pur-
chaser to make the machine operable. A court would have to determine
not only when substantial manufacture occurs but also whether it can
occur at all when the alleged infringer does not supply all the parts. Under
the Fifth Circuit's test, a court might hold that such manufacture could
be accomplished with a substantial number of the required parts. How-
ever, if it were held that substantial manufacture occurred only if the
competing seller exported all parts, the seller could then avoid the Fifth
Circuit's test by directing the overseas buyer to supply one essential part.
The Patent Act entitles a patent holder to prohibit the manufacture
or sale of his patented device within the United States.5 2 To the extent that
he restricts trade in this machine, he has a monopoly. But a patent "is a
privilege which is conditioned by a public purpose."5' 3 In the principal
case, the Fifth Circuit does not seem to have had this primarily in mind.
The substantial manufacture test places undue emphasis upon the patent
holder's reward. It harms the United States economy since it may increase
costs of patented export products by its tendency to allow the patentee
£7443 F.2d at 939.
"See text accompanying notes 13-17 supra.
"Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Link-Belt Co., 371 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1966).
-0443 F.2d at 939.
571 d.
52Note 3 supra.
53Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666 (1944); accord, Preci-
sion Instr. Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945). See 4 A.
DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS § 207 (2d ed. 1965).
